We study conditions for the emergence of cooperation in a spatial common-pool resource game. A fixed number of harvesters are located on a spatial grid. Harvesters are distributed among three strategies: defection, cooperation and enforcement. Enforcers punish all defectors located in their neighborhood. Individual payoffs are affected by global factors, namely aggregate harvest and resource stock level, and also by local factors, namely sanctioning among neighbors. Both factors depend on the distribution of strategies in the population. Evolution of strategies in the population is driven by social learning through imitation. Numerous equilibria can be identified in the system. An important finding is that clusters of cooperators and enforcers can survive among large groups of defectors. We discuss how our findings contrast with the non-spatial, but otherwise similar, game of Sethi and Somanathan (1996) .
Introduction
The management of common-pool resources (CPR), such as forests and ground water basins, is characterized by a conflict between individual and social interests. While the collective interest of the group is to limit harvest to a sustainable level, the combined actions of individual harvesters 1 pursuing their own interest inevitably results in a suboptimal outcome characterized by excessive exploitation of the resource (Dasgupta and Heal, 1979, Chapter 3) . This dilemma has been traditionally framed as a game played by two types of harvesters, namely defectors, adopting high levels of exploitation of the resource, and cooperators, with low levels of harvest (Ostrom et al., 1994) . In the finitely repeated CPR game, unilateral defection is the unique Nash equilibrium and privatization of the resource the sole management issue.
In recent years, many studies have shown that cooperation between harvesters has been or can be achieved in a self-organized or self-governed way (Ostrom, 1990) . Cooperative outcomes can be reached in common-pool situations as long as norms or rules such as trust, reward or punishment prevail in the group. Sanctioning harvesters adopting excessive exploitation levels has proved to be particularly effective, even in the case of non-repeated interactions among unrelated individuals or in very large groups. Evidence from the field suggests that some agents voluntarily engage in 'altruistic punishment', i.e. in punishing free-riders, even if it goes along with an individual cost.
This behavior can be motivated by the objective of large cooperative outcomes at the collective level and by negative feelings towards defectors. Often, a small proportion of altruistic punishers in a group is sufficient to achieve cooperation (Fehr and Gächter, 2002) .
A rare theoretical analysis of the role of altruistic punishers or 'enforcers' in solving CPR dilemmas is presented in Sethi and Somanathan (1996) . They consider an evolutionary CPR game played by a fixed population of players distributed among three strategies: defection, cooperation and enforcement. Payoffs of defectors are lowered by a sanction that depends on the number of enforcers in the population, while enforcers bear a cost which depends on the total number of defectors. After each interaction, players can modify their strategy by switching to the strategy that yields the highest payoffs. This can be regarded as a form of social learning. The evolution of strategies in the population is modeled through a replicator dynamics equation, which reflects the increasing tendency over time of the share of the best performing strategy in the population.
Sethi and Somanathan combine replicator and resource dynamics to show how changes in the resource stock affect harvesting behavior, and vice versa. They identify two stable states in the system, namely a final population composed of only defectors and one with only cooperators and enforcers.
The present model adds a major innovation to Sethi and Somanathan's work, namely spatial interactions between the agents. The objective of the paper is to find conditions for the emergence of sustained cooperation in the spatial evolutionary CPR game. Implicitly, we aim to test the robustness of Sethi and Somanathans' results in a spatial evolutionary CPR game.
Emphazing spatial aspects in resource issues draws from several motivations. First, many natural resources are spatially distributed. Their distribution can be rather uniform over space, like water in certain lakes, or it can exhibit local disparities, like vegetation in forests or fish in coastal waters. Second, many resource issues are characterized by spatial connectivity and interactions between the agents. Pollution, for instance, first spreads to adjacent areas. Farmers can be connected through networks of irrigation pipes, so that the pumping of water in one location will affect nearby farmers. Third, spatial proximity of the agents plays a major role in monitoring. In many cases, actual free-riders can only be observed by close neighbors. For instance, in the Mormon community around Salt Lake City, each irrigator receives water from a close neighbor and passes it on to another. In this setting, each irrigator then monitors the next one so that there is no need for an outside monitoring system (Smith, 2000) . Similarly, in large forest areas, adjacent neighbors are the only ones who can adequately point out 'cheaters' that try to expand their fence area.
The present CPR game with spatial interactions relates to two different bodies of literature. First, it connects to studies on local interactions games within the field of evolutionary game theory. Nowak and Sigmund (1999) present an overview of such games. Our model adopts a framework similar to Nowak and May (1992) , but generalize their 2x2 game format to a larger set of interactions with enforcement as an additional strategy.
In addition, our model relates to research on the evolution of social norms in CPR games. Most of this research is based on experimental work (Ostrom et al., 1994) and, neglect remarkably the role of resource dynamics in the system. Only a few studies have formally analyzed an evolutionary CPR game with a variable resource stock. Some existing models reach high levels of theoretical analysis by introducing complex resource dynamics or by formalizing decision-making as a function of many variables (Akiyama and Kaneko, 2000) . It is difficult to compare this type of work with the model of Sethi and Somanathan (1996) , which provides an attractive benchmark because of its simplicity and explanatory power. However, while Sethi and Somanathan focus mainly on aggregate population dynamics, the present model instead more realistically emphasizes the role of locality and of micro-interactions between the agents. Our approach is, therefore, unlike replicator dynamics, based on explicit modelling of interactions among individuals.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the benchmark neoclassical CPR game and its evolutionary spatial version. Section 3 identifies stable states of the system and shows how these contrast with Sethi and Somanathan's findings. In addition, effects of changes in parameters is tested for. Section 4 discusses the impact of resource dynamics in the system. Section 5 concludes.
The Model

The CPR game
In this section, we present the standard CPR game (Dasgupta and Heal, 1979 , Chichilnisky, 1994 , Ostrom et al., 1994 . It relies on the assumption of maximizing behavior and thus contrasts with evolutionary versions of the game, which we will consider in the next section. Nevertheless, the standard CPR game allows to discuss the main framework, while its analytical insights serve as a benchmark for the evolutionary analysis.
A fixed population of Ò (Ò ½) harvesters has access to a common-pool of resources. Individual effort level of harvester (
level reflects the intensity of the harvesting activity. Effort can be measured by the amount of labor or capital employed in harvesting, such as the number of vessels on a fishing ground or the engine 4 power of irrigation pumps. Total effort of the population is simply the sum of all individual efforts:
Aggregate harvest À is a strictly concave and increasing function of total effort Ø and of the total stock of natural resources AE Ø . In a first stage, we abstract from resource dynamics. We fix the resource stock AE Ø at AE ¼ , so that the harvest rate can be written as a function of only. The resource stock will be reintroduced in Section 4.
Harvesters bear a constant cost Û for each unit of effort employed. The function ´ µ is assumed to lie above Û , the total effort cost, up to some level Ç and to fall below it for higher values of . This is illustrated in Figure 1 . where it is assumed that the price of the harvested commodity is the numéraire. Thus, the level of aggregate profits is
At È , which is the Pareto efficient level of effort defined by ¼´ È µ Û (the subscript È stands for Pareto equilibrium), total profits are maximized and the resource is used efficiently.
When access to the resource is open to everyone, entry of harvesters continues until ´ Ç µ Û Ç 1 , which is the point where no harvester enjoys positive profits.
Even with a fixed population of agents maximization of individual profits leads to a suboptimal outcome. 2 The resulting Nash equilibrium 3 is unique and involves excessive use of the resource since È . Nevertheless, there are still positive rents at the equilibrium since Ç .
In the spatial evolutionary CPR game presented in Section 2.2, we will refer to È and Ç as benchmark aggregate harvest rates. The common-pool equilibrium harvest rate must always fall in between these two values.
A spatial evolutionary CPR game
We modify the CPR game described above to introduce spatial interactions. In the spatial game, the process is evolutionary since the evolution of the diversity of strategies is driven by a selection and diffusion mechanism, namely social learning. Agents do not optimize when deciding about which strategy to adopt, but, instead, learn and switch strategies using simple rules such as imita- Figure 2 . Both cooperators and enforcers choose a low level of effort Ü Ä to avoid overexploitation of the resource, while defectors choose a high level of effort Ü À , which yields higher profits ceteris paribus. Individual effort levels Ü Ä and Ü À are fixed such that
where, as discussed in the previous section, È is the optimal level of total harvest, and Ç is the total level of harvest in an open-access situation, and ÒÜ Ä (ÒÜ À ) is the total harvest when all agents harvest low (high).
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In each round ( ½ ¾ ) of the game, the aggregate effort can be calculated according to the distribution of strategies in the population:
where Ò , Ò and Ò are respectively the number of defectors, enforcers and cooperators present in the system at round .
Enforcers punish all defectors located in their neighborhood. In other words, in the spatial model, monitoring occurs locally among close neighbors. This is a major difference with Sethi and Somanathan's model in which sanctions are exerted by the group of enforcers upon the group of defectors at the population level. Each enforcer punishing a defector bears a cost , while each defector being punished by an enforcer has to pay a sanction AE. Thus, the maximal sanction (cost) that can fall upon a defector (an enforcer) is AE ( ), which corresponds to the situation where he is surrounded by four enforcers (defectors).
These specific settings of the local monitoring system draw inspiration from examples of common-pool resource communities described by Ostrom (1990) . In our community, an enforcing agent can bring charges against one or several of his defective neighbors in front of a local court. To do so, he pays some administrative costs for each defector. In return, the court decides on the fine to be paid by defectors. The total fine falling on a defector increases with the number of neighbors that have brought charges against him. Finally, costs and fines are paid directly to the court, which uses these sums for enhancement of the community such as improving roads or schools. This implies that individual agents cannot extract any private monetary benefits from the fines collected.
Payoffs are calculated according to a player's current strategy, the aggregate effort and the strategies located in the neighborhood of each agent. This is formalized as follows:
where denotes payoffs in round with strategy , ´¼ µ denotes the number of enforcers in the neighborhood of any given defector, and Ñ´¼ Ñ µ the number of defectors in the neighborhood of any given enforcer. Thus, ¿ ¾ refers to the payoffs of a defector surrounded by three enforcers in round
Further, we will use the notations to refer to a defector punished times and thus paying the sanction AE. Similarly, Ñ refers to an enforcer surrounded by Ñ defectors and thus bearing a cost Ñ. From (5), (7), (8), and (9), we have ¼ ½ and ¼ for all .
We pose one additional assumption regarding the level of punishment in the system,
holds for all . This implies that a defector incurring the maximum sanction level earns less payoffs than any enforcer that is not punishing (E0) or cooperator. If this assumption would not hold, defection would always be the best strategy and the sure outcome would be an equilibrium with only defectors.
Assumption (10) can be rewritten as
This simplifies into
Thus, (10) is satisfied for all , i.e. in every round , whenever
In the spatial model we assume further that À´ AEµ is a Cobb-Douglas production function.
As discussed in Section 2.1, we can solve ¼´ È µ Û and ´ Ç µ Û Ç to find È and Ç respectively. This gives
In each round, every player updates his current strategy by imitating the strategy that yields the highest payoffs in his neighborhood. When the best strategy in the neighborhood is identical to the player's current strategy, the player sticks to his current strategy.
When multiple strategies other than the player's current strategy yield the largest payoff in the neighborhood, the player randomizes among these strategies with probability Ô ¼ . Learning by imitation implies that deviation of behavior is only driven by expectations of larger profits in the next round. Large profit differentials and limited information imply that a defector can suddenly switch to enforcement and, inversely, that an enforcer can adopt a defective strategy in the next round. According to Bowles and Gintis (2002) , such strong deviations in behavior are, in reality, eased by the impact of emotions. Shame, for instance, can help justifying an extreme deviation from defection to enforcement.
(iv.) Time. We assume that agents exhibit synchronous behavior. In other words, interactions and learning occur simultaneously. The stock AE ¼ is available at the beginning of each round.
The following sequence describes a round of the game:
1. Aggregate effort is computed given the distribution of strategies in the population.
2. Aggregate harvest À´ AE ¼ µ is calculated.
3. Individual payoffs are computed for all agents given À´ AE ¼ µ, the strategy chosen by each single agent and the distribution of strategies in his neighborhood.
4. Agents synchronously observe the performance of his neighbors' strategies and decides whether to stick to their current strategy or adopt a more successful one observed in their neighborhood. Strategies are then redistributed over the whole population.
Although common in local interaction games, these assumptions are not always realistic in economic contexts. 5 In resource issues, asynchronous harvest can, for instance, be observed in irrigation systems where each farmer pumps water in sequential order. Nevertheless, when dealing with other types of natural resources like forests or fish stocks, harvesting is often seasonal. Synchronous harvest is then reasonable because harvesters modify their strategy at the beginning of each new season.
Spatial evolutionary dynamics 3.1 Definition of equilibria
In this section we provide definitions of equilibria in the system. We distinguish between local and global equilibria as follows:
Definition 1 A player is said to be in a local equilibrium when his current strategy earns no lower profits than any different strategy located in his neighborhood.
Definition 2 A global equilibrium is a spatial distribution of strategies in which all players are in a local equilibrium.
In other words, a global equilibrium is a spatial distribution of strategies in which no player has an incentive to change strategy. Note that it is possible for a neighboring strategy to earn a larger profit than the player's current strategy when these strategies are also identical. This specific case is illustrated in Appendix C.
Simulation results
Notation and parameter values
In this section, we illustrate the main findings of the model using numerical simulations. We identify equilibria and study how changes in parameter values affect these.
In the following sections, we use D, C, E to refer to equilibria composed of only defectors, cooperators or enforcers, respectively. In addition, DE, CE and CDE refer to equilibria composed of the corresponding mix of strategies.
Which equilibrium emerges depends upon three factors: 
Given the other parameter values, the levels of harvest Ü À and Ü Ä satisfy (5) A sensitivity analysis of critical parameters is conducted in Section 3.2.4.
The effects of the initial spatial distribution of strategies
In this section, we study the effects of teh initial spatial arrangement of strategies on convergence to equilibria. For this purpose, we use a procedure that randomizes uniformly the spatial distribution of the strategies while keeping the shares of each strategy in the population fixed. Second, enforcers who punish at least one defector switch to cooperation when cooperators are located in their neighborhood. The final spatial outcome of these two processes depends upon which one dominates. If cooperators eliminate enforcers before these can block defection, the system will subsequently consist of only defectors and cooperators and, ultimately, defection will spread over the whole lattice. If, however, enforcers eliminate defectors before switching to cooperation, the system will end up with only enforcers and cooperators, i.e. a CE equilibrium is reached. We can observe these processes in Figure 3 . Starting from Þ ¼ , the initial change is an increase in the number of cooperators, or a drop in the number of defectors and enforcers. Indeed, defectors are replaced by enforcers and, at the same time, the number of enforcers decreases as cooperators spread. In Figure 3a , 3b and 3c, enforcers cannot eliminate all defectors so that the number of cooperators reaches a maximum before the system settles in a CE equilibrium. At this stage, there are too few enforcers left in the system to prevent the spread of defection. In Figure 3a , defection spreads through the whole lattice (D), while in Figure 3b and Figure 3c , the final lattice exhibits clusters of coexisting strategies (DE, CDE).
One type of equilibria is associated with many spatial configurations of the population. While in Figure 3c the system ends up in a CDE equilibrium with Þ ¼ 1 ¿ ¼ ¾ ¼ ¿ µ, there exists in fact a large range of potential coordinates Þ ¼ . The survival of clusters in the long-run depends on the initial number of enforcers who do not punish any defectors ( ¼). All enforcers with enforcers ¼ in their neighborhood are in a local equilibrium whenever enforcement is the best strategy in the neighborhood. These enforcers are in some sense 'protected' by the presence of an enforcer ¼ in their neighborhood which thus blocks the spread of defection. Similarly, cooperators can survive when these are surrounded by one or several enforcers ¼. Since both strategies earn equal payoffs, both cooperators and enforcers will stick to their current strategy. Thus, groups of cooperators are protected from the spread of defection by a certain number of enforcers ¼ and ½. A typical CDE equilibrium is composed of one or more clusters of cooperators surrounded by a group of enforcers among which many are enforcers ¼. This is then surrounded by a shell of defectors. An example of such a cluster is given in Figure   4 . A detailed example of these mechanisms and of the role of enforcers ¼ is given in Appendix D. In the non-spatial or aggregate game, enforcers always earn less than cooperators and are thus eliminated, as long as they are neighbors to defectors. Accordingly, a population left with only cooperators and defectors is not in equilibrium since defection spreads quickly. By contrast, in the spatial model, enforcers ½ to are eliminated by cooperators only if these are located in their neighborhood. If instead these enforcers are located next to other enforcers earning higher payoffs, they can survive in the long-run and play a role in blocking the spread of defectors. The foregoing analysis shows that Sethi and Somanathan's findings are not robust in a spatial game.
The effects of initial strategy shares in the population
In this section, we study the impact of the initial strategy share on the final equilibrium. In other words, we consider a variation in the initial distribution of the three strategies.
To reduce the number of runs necessary to cover the whole simplex, only initial strategy shares equals to multiples of 0.05 are considered. The set of initial coordinates The frequency defines the frequency of convergence to a given equilibrium averaged over the whole set of possible shares. Starting from any initial point in the simplex, ½± of the runs converge to a D equilibrium. By contrast, only ½ ± of the runs converge to a CDE equilibrium. Table 2 also presents the maximum initial share of defectors, enforcers and cooperators above which the respective equilibrium cannot be achieved. For instance, the system will not be able to converge to a D equilibrium if the share of enforcers in the population is larger than ±. The large maximum shares for DE and CDE equilibria suggest that there is a wide range of initial coordinates for which these equilibria can be achieved. Note that C equilibria only occur for a population initially composed of only cooperators, while E equilibria are only identified for initial populations without any cooperators. 
Sensitivity analysis
In this section, we study how the frequency of equilibria is affected by changes in parameter values.
We first discuss the possible impacts of these parameters intuitively. Next, we conduct a sensitivity analysis of three central parameters: AE, « and Ò.
As the level of sanction increases, the size of the set of D equilibria shrinks and more cooperative outcomes emerge. An increase in the net return to harvesting À´ AEµ , coming for instance from an improvement in technology or a rise in the resource price, causes profits to increase and gives an advantage to defectors. As a consequence, the set of D equilibria expands. This effect might be mitigated by a rise in Û, the opportunity cost of labor, although wage adjustments often lag behind the other effects.
When population size increases, i.e. as there are more harvesters for a same amount of resource, total effort increases too. This effect translates into a drop in net return to harvesting causing the size of the set of D equilibria to shrink. Sethi and Somanathan argue that population growth will reduce the impact of individual sanctions. They suggest that as the group gets larger, it becomes more difficult for enforcers to detect defectors. This can be interpreted as an 'anonimity' effect. In view of the foregoing, we performed a sensitivity analysis of the three following parameters, namely the sanction level AE, the parameter « that reflects harvest technology or resource price, and finally the population size Ò. The sanction level is varied from AE ¼ ½ to AE ½ in 14 steps of ¼ ½. The parameter « is varied between « ¼ ½ and « ¼ in 6 steps of ¼ ½. Finally, the population size is increased from Ò ¿ to Ò ½¾½. To do so, the grid size is increased in 5 steps with grids of 6x6, 7x7, , 10x10, 11x11.
For each possible parameter configuration, we performed simulations as in Section 3.2.3. Results are given like in Table 2in terms of average frequency of occurence of a given equilibrium.
The range of parameters converging to D equilibria in the parameter space´« AE « µ and´Ò AE Ò µ is given in Figure 6a and 6b. We scaled the increase in sanction level as changes in « and Ò affect the level of profits and thus the force of the sanction. Contour lines in Figure 6 delimit the set of 21 parameters converging to a D equilibria at a given frequency. For instance, the set of parameter values for which D equilibria are reached at a frequency larger or equal to ¼± is located below or on the contour line ¼ . 
Spatial evolutionary and resource dynamics 4.1 Definition of resource stock equilibria
In this section, we introduce resource dynamics in the system. The growth rate ´AEµ of the resource stock is consistent with logistic growth:
where Ö is the intrinsic growth rate of the resource and AE Ã its carrying capacity. An additional step is introduced in the time sequence of the game (see paragragh´ Ú µ in Section 2.2). At the end of each round, the resource stock is increased according to the replenishment rate (17) and depleted by total harvest, i.e. the sum of individual harvest:
where ´AE Ø µ is the replenishment rate of the resource. ´AEµ reaches a maximum at AE Å Ë ¼, 
The main result following from the introduction of resource dynamics in the system is summarized in Proposition 1. Proposition 1 states that as the system converges to an equilibria D, CE, DE, CDE, C or E, as identified in Section 3., the resource stock will also converge to an equilibrium level in the longrun.
In Figure 7 below, every curve À´ AEµ intersects with ´AEµ in two different points. Stability results of these intersections can be observed intuitively. Arrows in Figure 7 show the direction of resource dynamics. A left (right) pointing arrow indicates a decrease (increase) in the resource stock; this holds for intervals where ´AEµ À AEµ ( ´AEµ À AEµ). Looking at the directions of the arrows, it is clear that only the second intersection point is locally stable. Thus, starting from AE AE, it can be seen in Figure 7 that the resource stock will always converge to a stable state. Total harvest achieved in a D equilibrium is given by the curve À´ À AE µ. The equilibrium resource stock corresponding to the D equilibrium is given by AE À . Similarly, in CE, C or E equilibria, total harvest corresponds to À´ Ä AE µ and the stock will converge to the corresponding equilibrium resource stock AE Ä . Obviously, AE Ä AE À implies that the equilibrium stock is larger for a cooperative equilibrium than for a defective one. The same reasoning applies to equilibria DE and CDE. As shown in Figure 7 , a given DE or CDE equilibrium corresponds with a particular curve À´ £ AE µ, where Ä £ À . Then the resource stock will converge to AE £ with AE À AE £ AE Ä . Obviously, all equilibrium stocks for CDE and DE equilibria fall within the range defined by AE À and AE Ä .
Under some conditions no positive equilibrium resource stock can be reached. Figure 8 shows some special cases. In Figure 8a , the resource stock will be inevitably depleted in the long-run since aggregate harvest always exceeds the replenishment rate of the resource for all stock levels.
In Figure 8b , a D equilibrium will always result in overexploitation of the resource. Nevertheless, in the case depicted, there exist DE and CDE equilibria with a harvest level equal to À´ £ AE µ and a positive resource stock. 
Simulation results
Simulations were conducted using the same parameters as in Section 3.2. In addition, we set We obtain a wide range of equilibrium resource stock levels. This contrasts with Sethi and Somanathan's model who only find that AE À and AE Ä are stable. in the spatial game, Figure 9 illustrates the evolution over time of the two kind of dynamics: evolution of strategies and evolution of the resource stock. The upper graphs show the evolution of the three strategies, while the lower graph illustrates the resource stock dynamics. Starting from AE ¼ ¼¼, resource levels increase steadily until the equilibrium state. The stable stock achieved in a CDE equilibria is larger than the stable stock corresponding to a D equilibria. The evolution of strategies in the population is characterized by an early increase (decrease) in the number of cooperators (defectors).
(a) D-equilibria (b) CDE-equilibria (c) CE-equilibria Figure 9 . Evolution of strategies and resource stock dynamics toward an equilibrium
Conclusion
In this article, we have analyzed spatial evolution with three strategies, namely defection, cooperation and enforcement, in a common-pool resource game. A larger set of equilibria is found than in the non-spatial game of Sethi and Somanathan (1996) . In particular, two additional equilibrium population distributions can be observed, namely one with a mix of defectors and enforcers, and one where all three strategies coexist. Like in other types of games on grid, it was shown that cooperation can be more easily achieved in games with local interactions.
Our model offers theoretical foundations for a large body of case studies and experimental work related to common-pool resource issues. In particular, it provides a realistic description of 27 communities in which monitoring is realized through neighbors interactions. Such systems are truly decentralized and self-organized. The analysis supports the idea that sustainable resource use can be achieved by self-organized systems.
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APPENDIX A. Nash equilibrium of the CPR game
This analysis of the CPR game is based on Dasgupta and Heal (1979) . In the CPR game, the number of harvesters is fixed but there is still overexploitation of the resource. This can be shown by solving the individual maximization problem of a single agent. Assuming that all other harvesters together have an aggregate effort level of Ü , agent chooses Ü (
By taking the first derivative with respect to Ü and applying the chain rule, follows
Thus, each agent will choose Ü that solves equation (A-2). The corresponding aggregate effort level is , which is the Nash equilibrium of the commons. This solution is obtained when all harvesters maximize their profits individually. By contrast, the Pareto efficient equilibrium is reached when all harvesters agree to reduce their effort level to È , which maximize the profits of the group.
The effort level is not efficient since we can show that È . is given by 
APPENDIX B -Illustration of the learning process
Figure 10 below illustrates the learning process in different situations. Defectors are represented in dark grey, enforcers in grey and cooperators in light grey. In Figure 10a , player A will switch to defection in the next round. Indeed, the best strategy in the neighborhood of player A is the strategy of player B, i.e. defection. Figure 10b illustrates the assumption that the player always keeps his current strategy whenever there exists another neighboring strategy (or several) earning the same payoffs than his current strategy. Player A is a cooperator surrounded by 4 enforcers who do not punish any defectors. We have ¼ and player A will keep his current strategy.
In Figure 10c , we assume ¿ . Player A earns ½ which is less than the payoffs of any of his neighbors. However, his neighbors earn all equal payoffs. In this situation, player A randomizes among defection and cooperation with probability Ô ¼ . 
APPENDIX C -An example of local equilibrium
In this section, we illustrate a specific case of local equilibrium. Here, the best strategy in the neighborhood earns larger profits than the player's current strategy. Nevertheless, the player is in a local equilibrium since the best strategy is identical to his current strategy.
In Figure 11 In Figure 12 below, agent A is a defector punished only twice and can thus spread in his neighborhood. Agents B are defectors who are punished three times and will thus switch to cooperation which is the best strategy in their neighborhood. However, at ½ , the southern neighbor of A is a defector ¾ since his neighbor B has switched to cooperation. Hence, agent B will switch to defection. In this example, there are not enough enforcers ¼ to block the spread of defection.
The latter is moreover facilitated by the proximity of groups of defectors and cooperators. 
¿
In Figure 13 , agent A is again a defector ¾ and spreads in his neighborhood. All defectors punished at least three times and not located next to A will switch to enforcement, which is the best strategy in their neighborhood. Nevertheless, defection will not spread over the whole lattice
given that at ¼ all enforcers ½ located next to defectors ¿ earn larger payoffs than those defectors. The latter are, however, protected by A and will keep their strategy. 
½
In Figure 14 , defectors are isolated and all are punished more than twice. As a result, they are quickly eliminated. There is one enforcer ½ in the bottom-left corner who, not protected by an enforcer E0, switches to cooperation. 
